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Introduction  
 
While the collapse of the Communist regime in Eastern Europe brought to the surface various 
cleavages between its former ally countries, what many of them shared was an aspiration to 
embark on a development model with an end goal of joining the European Union (EU). The 
EU has served as a reference point regarding the systemic convergence through 
modernization of the countries in the region (Sadakata, 2006, p. 40). The post-Communist 
development of the West Balkans, however, has been severely disrupted by the civil wars that 
shattered the Former Yugoslavia (hereafter referred to as FY) throughout the 1990s.  
Wars have substantial consequences for the consolidation of democracy, and have caused 
demographic, socio-economic and social problems in the new countries (Fink-Hafner and 
Ladrech, 2008, p. 137). However, what is striking is that not only has their Europeanization 
process differed from other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, but also that 
among the countries of the Former Yugoslavia a differentiated form of integration has taken 
place. On the one hand there are countries like Slovenia, a full EU member state, and Croatia, 
an acceding country set to join in July 2013, and on the other hand, countries like Serbia, a 
candidate country, and Bosnia i Herzegovina, a potential candidate, which have a long way to 
go on the path to membership. What are the reasons for these differences? How can we 
explain such variation in degrees of EU membership given that these countries were part of 
the same state a mere twenty-two years ago? What factors explain the quick democratic 
consolidation and compliance with EU conditionality of some FY states, on one hand, and the 
fragmented, problematic and generally slow Europeanization process of other FY states on 
the other?  
In order to answer these questions, this thesis examines the role of two key factors in 
determining different degrees of EU membership – the role of ethnicity, and the legacy of 
civil war in the internal political environment. The effect that these factors have on degrees 
of membership is tested on three FY countries as case studies – Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia 
i Herzegovina. While these countries share many characteristics, including a common 
history and a liberal model of development among others, the focus of this research is to 
what extent ethnicity and the legacy of civil war, and variation in their role in the 
accession process, affect the different degrees of the case countries’ EU membership. This 
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research tests whether the success in overcoming ethnic tensions and the legacies of civil 
war decreases the domestic costs for compliance with EU conditionality and, hence, 
positively contributes to an upgrade in EU membership status.  
This thesis analyzes each country’s democratization process, its internal political 
environment, and its Europeanization path in light of the two factors under investigation. It 
analyzes the European Commission Progress Reports evaluating these countries’ progress 
in terms of ethnopolitics – the presence of ethnic political parties in domestic politics, – 
and civil war legacies, translated into cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The analysis in this thesis has established that ethnicity 
and civil war legacies play a substantial but differentiated role in Bosnia, Serbia and 
Croatia’s EU membership bids. While in Bosnia ethnicity has been a major stumbling 
block in the accession process, cooperation with The Hague Tribunal has been rather 
smooth. On the contrary, in the cases of Serbia and Croatia, cooperation with the ICTY has 
directly affected the upgrade in EU membership status. For these two countries, however, 
the issue of ethnicity, also characterized by nationalistic sentiments, while present in both 
cases, has not directly constituted an impediment to EU status upgrade.  
There are also other country-specific factors which play a role in the accession process. 
Therefore, if one is to derive conclusive generalizations on what determines costs for rule 
compliance, it is crucial to look at all the factors and their effects on the degree of EU 
membership in all FY countries. This thesis will focus on the role of ethnicity and the 
legacy of civil war in order to fill a gap in research on compliance with EU conditionality 
in the West Balkans, while acknowledging that these other factors might influence degrees 
of membership as well.  
The first section of this thesis will provide an overview of the literature in the field and will 
describe the theory used in this research, including a justification for its applicability. The 
second section will describe the dependent and independent variables, as well as the 
hypotheses to be tested and the respective indicators used. The third section will briefly 
explain the process of EU enlargement before going to section four and the in-depth 
analysis of the three case studies. The last section will conclude.  
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Section One: Rule compliance and rational choice 
 
Rule compliance 
What factors play a role in inducing compliance with EU membership conditionality? The 
literature on the processes of compliance in CEE states centres on factors that either 
empower or constrain actors to comply with EU accession requirements. The impact of the 
European Union on candidate countries’ compliance processes has been examined in light 
of the domestic political environment of aspiring states as a crucial determining factor 
(Goets and Hix, 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; Kelley, 2004; 
Schimmelfennig, 2007; Grabbe, 2011). The literature further focuses on a number of 
themes which will be discussed here – external drivers for compliance, the characteristics 
of the aspiring states, and the nature of EU conditionality – as factors inducing compliance. 
Firstly, a significant body of literature on EU conditionality focuses on the external drivers 
which either induce or hamper compliance. The most widely cited model is that of 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) called the External Incentives model. It attempts to 
explain Europeanization and the effect of EU conditionality’s incentives and rewards on 
the domestic political environment. In its nature it is a “rationalist bargaining model” (p. 
10). Whether the external incentives are effective depends on four factors: the determinacy 
of conditions, the size and speed of the rewards, the credibility of the conditionality, and 
veto players and adoption costs (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 12). The model 
asserts that external incentives are not sufficient for Europeanization when the costs of 
domestic adaptation are too high (Schimmelfennig, 2007, p. 131).  
Furthermore, Grabbe (2002) identifies a number of other external drivers that affect 
compliance in the accession process, which she calls levers: access to negotiations and 
subsequent accession stages, provision of institutional and legislative templates, aid and 
technical assistance, advice on policy and twinning projects, monitoring and public 
criticism. According to her, these tools affect the institutional transformation in CEE 
countries and as a result the ability to comply with EU conditions (p. 256). Another 
external driver identified by Bohmelt and Freyburg (2012) is compliance behaviour at 
different phases of the enlargement process (p. 3). The stages they identify are application, 
recognition as a candidate, opening of negotiations, closure of negotiations, and accession 
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(p. 5-6). Their research shows that while negotiations are ongoing, states have stronger 
incentives to comply with conditionality, than once the membership is almost secured, 
when the incentive for compliance largely decreases (p. 3). 
Secondly, the literature also looks at the characteristics of the aspiring states themselves as 
a factor determining compliance. Vachudova (2005) explains variation in compliance with 
conditionality in CEE countries with the costs for the governing elites to fulfill the 
requirements, based on usage of restricted political competition, corruption in the economy 
and ethnic nationalism for retaining power (p. 72). Furthermore, she points to another 
factor that determines compliance – the agendas of states which she labels as liberal largely 
overlap with EU requirements, and that makes it more likely that these requirements will 
be fulfilled. At the same time, states labeled as illiberal have perceived EU requirements as 
a threat for the domestic power of the ruling elites and as a result the latter have forsaken 
the benefits of membership in order to protect their power base (p. 72-73).  
Furthermore, Noutcheva and Aydin-Duzgit (2011), in investigating the fluctuations in the 
rule-of-law reforms within the enlargement process, contend that EU incentives to execute 
reforms have a positive impact on aspiring states only when political agents on the 
domestic level and their interests align with the legislative changes advocated by the EU. 
When this is not the case, the costs of applying rule-of-law reforms become too high and 
there is no or only patchy reform (p. 61-62). Grabbe (2011) contends that membership 
incentives frame governments’ agendas also because some aspiring states are prone and 
willing to compete with other aspiring states (p. 1015).  
Thirdly, the literature on compliance investigates the specific nature of the EU and its 
conditionality as a determining factor. Kelley (2004) compares the effects of membership 
conditionality with socialization-based efforts, such as social influence and persuasion (p. 
426). She estimates that socialization-based efforts on their own cannot effectively 
influence a state’s domestic policy. As domestic opposition to change in policy coming 
from the EU grows, it is crucial to include membership conditionality in order to ensure 
compliance (p. 449). This notion also relates to the EU’s normative power which refocuses 
away from the EU’s institutions and “towards including cognitive processes, with both 
substantive and symbolic components” (Manners, 2002, p. 239). In this process the EU’s 
desire for more legitimacy through imposing its fundamental norms (Manners, 2002, p. 
244) has also played a role in the enlargement process. However, regarding norms, some 
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authors also argue that the EU does not have a strong normative stance in the Western 
Balkans for example, and this affects the degree to which countries in that region comply 
with the EU’s requirements (Noutcheva, 2009, p. 1066).  
On a similar note, Hughes, Sasse and Gordon (2004) point to the unevenness of EU 
conditionality translated in the acquis communautaire, the body of EU legislation, and 
claim that the level of detail of the conditions in the different policy areas determines 
compliance. The “thicker” a certain policy area in terms of explicit rules, the stronger the 
leverage of the EU to induce compliance, while the “thinner” the acquis, the weaker the 
explicit leverage of the EU (p. 527).  
Explaining compliance: a Rational Choice Institutionalist approach 
The explanations for compliance with EU conditionality discussed above are also relevant to 
this thesis. However, in seeking to answer the specific question of whether ethnicity and the 
legacies of civil war have an impact on rule compliance in FY countries, and hence, their 
degrees of membership in the European Union, the above explanations are insufficient. This 
section will explain why. It will further suggest a theoretical framework which is better suited 
to answering the research question. 
The external incentives model is the most relevant framework through which to assess 
compliance but is incomplete for this thesis because it does not account for civil war legacies 
and ethnopolitics when giving explanations for rule compliance (see above). Only one of its 
“incentives” – veto players and adoption costs – is relevant to the independent variables, as 
the impact of the variables is determined partially by the veto players and adoption costs in 
domestic politics. Grabbe’s (2002) external levers are also insufficient in explaining the 
impact of the independent variables on degrees of membership. While she acknowledges the 
importance of institutional transformation for compliance with EU rules, she addresses the 
accession process largely through the lens of compliance with the acquis, while ethnopolitics 
and civil war legacies go beyond its mere 35 Chapters. Vachudova’s (2005) framework for 
assessing aspiring states’ compliance based on liberal and illiberal notions is also limited 
because of its preoccupation with democratization and liberal democratic development, while 
not accounting for the impact of civil war legacies. In terms of the EU’s normative power and 
compliance, including the EU’s socialization-based efforts, literature shows that norms have 
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only been partially successful in explaining the costs for rule adoption and in general appear 
to be weak in Western Balkan states.  
All of these possible explanations fail to grasp fully the specificities of compliance with EU 
rules in light of ethnicity and the legacies of civil war within the domestic political 
environment of FY states. Therefore, this thesis will test the importance of these two factors 
through a more general theoretical framework, namely Rational Choice Institutionalism. The 
latter is better suited to capture the complexities of the chosen cases for a number of reasons. 
Rational Choice Institutionalism attributes an important role for institutions in political 
outcomes. Institutions are understood broadly as collections of structures which “define and 
defend interests” and which are “political actors in their own right” (March and Olsen, 1984, 
p. 738). In addition, extensive calculation and a strategic analysis are at the heart of this 
approach (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 944-945), and how political life is organized on the 
domestic level makes a difference (March and Olsen, 1984, p. 747). 
Therefore, in the case of the FY countries analyzed here, Rational Choice Institutionalism 
most comprehensively encompasses the effect of ethnicity and civil war legacies on the 
countries’ degrees of membership. This is the case because Rational Choice Institutionalism 
suggests that actors have a fixed set of preferences and their actions are completely 
instrumental in order to satisfy these preferences (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 944-945). 
Furthermore, according to this theory, an organizational structure is motivated by the way in 
which it decreases transaction, production and influence costs (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 946). 
Within this framework, therefore, it will be argued that compliance with accession 
requirements is the result of a cost-benefit analysis by aspiring states which determines the 
domestic costs of rule adoption, and these costs are different for the states for different 
reasons. But what is more, this thesis will investigate whether and to what extent domestic 
costs for rule compliance, resulting from the cost-benefit analysis, are affected specifically by 
1) ethnicity, and 2) civil war legacies. The details of how exactly this research will be carried 
out is the focus of the next section. 
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Section Two: Research design 
 
This paper will focus on three of the seven Former Yugoslavian countries. Therefore, the 
results will be limited in attempting to generalize the conclusions for all FY states. In 
attempting to account for variations in membership of the current three case countries, the 
research will also limit itself to testing the most essential indicators for measuring the 
independent variables while acknowledging that there might be other indicators which could 
contribute in varying degrees to answering the main research question. 
Variables and Hypotheses 
The dependent variable (DV) is degree of membership in the European Union. This variable 
further has three different levels corresponding to the different statuses of aspiring countries 
within the accession process – potential candidate, candidate country, and acceding country. 
This thesis will look at one control variable – democratic consolidation, and two independent 
variables (IVs): 1) ethnicity, and 2) the legacy of civil war. 
When accounting for degrees of membership in the EU, it is important to account for 
democratic consolidation. This is so, because membership in international organizations is 
seen as an impetus for states which are undergoing democratic transitions, and democratic 
consolidation is seen as a crucial factor affecting membership (Mansfield, Pevehouse, 2006, 
p. 138). Therefore, the first hypothesis is:  the slower the pace of democratic consolidation in 
a state, the less likely it is to provoke an upgrade in its membership status. 
The first central insight that this thesis will test is to what extent ethnicity plays a role in 
aspiring states’ cost-benefit analyses for compliance with EU conditionality, thereby affecting 
the degree of their EU membership. In order to assess ethnicity as a factor affecting the 
accession process, I will look at the presence of ethnopolitics, and I will use ethnic political 
parties in domestic politics as a proxy. There are a number of reasons for this. Chandra (2011) 
defines an ethnic party as being “the champion of the particular interests of one ethnic 
category or set of categories” (p. 155). What further characterizes such parties is that they 
always exclude a certain group (p. 155), hence their starting point is preferential treatment of 
some ethnic groups over others. Such preferential treatment directly conflicts with a key EU 
accession requirement enshrined in the so-called Copenhagen criteria for membership. 
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Therefore, it can be expected that the presence of such parties creates a political environment 
where certain actors oppose the EU’s rules. This, in turn, is likely to increase domestic costs 
for compliance with these rules for governments in the aspiring countries.  Thus, the second 
hypothesis is: the more a state’s domestic politics are characterized by the presence of ethnic 
political parties, the less likely it is to provoke an upgrade in its membership status. 
The second central insight that this thesis will test is to what extent the legacy of civil war is 
an important factor determining degree of EU membership. This thesis will focus on one 
factor which is directly connected with civil war legacies – responding to international post-
war obligations regarding criminal justice, in particular relations with the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). This cooperation has become a condition for EU 
membership for the FY countries, and opposition to it on the domestic level can be viewed as 
increasing the domestic costs for compliance for governments.  Therefore, the third 
hypothesis is:  the more the legacy of civil war affects domestic politics of a state, the less 
likely it is to provoke an upgrade in its membership status.  
Methods 
The method of research used will be case studies and this thesis will use the “most similar” 
cases design whereby the cases are quite similar in many respects (see next paragraph) apart 
from the IVs, and this can account for the cases reaching different outcomes concerning the 
DV (George and Bennett, 2004, p. 81).  
The case countries will be Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia i Herzegovina. Croatia is an 
acceding country which will join the Union in July 2013; Serbia is a candidate country; 
Bosnia i Herzegovina is a potential candidate.  Having been party to the conflicts in the 
Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, within the same period of time, they have reached 
different levels of development which translates into different degrees of membership in 
the EU. The three case countries were chosen because of a number of shared 
characteristics – a liberal economic model of development, a democratization agenda, 
important geo-strategic positions, common history, similar political organization, 
aspirations to join the EU, and a similar EU conditionality framework. Holding these 
similarities constant will help highlight the extent to which the independent variables – 
ethnicity and the legacies of civil war – affect the dependent variable, namely, different 
degrees of EU membership.  
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Operationalization of variables and data collection 
Democratic consolidation will be measured using data from Freedom House’s Nations in 
Transit country reports. The democratic score given to each country is derived from seven 
indicators – national democratic governance, electoral process, civil society, independent 
media, local democratic governance, judicial framework and independence, and corruption. 
The democratic score is an average of the ratings in the different categories which are tracked 
in a given year. The scale is 1 to 7, with 1 being the highest level of democratization, and 7 
being the lowest (Nations in Transit Report: Methodology, 2012). Furthermore, the Amnesty 
International annual reports on the case countries will also be used to measure 
democratization. As the latter will not be examined in detail but will serve as a control 
variable, only the overall scores will be taken into account. 
As for the influence of ethnopolitics, this is tested in terms of the presence and influence of 
ethnic political parties in the selected FY countries. The analysis investigates whether 
ethnopolitics have an effect on degrees of membership, by looking at the European 
Commission (EC) Progress Reports on these countries and investigating how/whether ethnic 
tensions in the internal political environment reflect in these reports and, as a result, on an 
eventual upgrade in membership status.  
Regarding cooperation with the ICTY, this research will again investigate the EC Progress 
Reports and specifically those sections where cooperation with the ICTY is monitored. 
Tracing the process of cooperation with the ICTY will test whether costs for compliance with 
EU rules have increased or diminished as a result of cooperation with or opposition to the 
ICTY.   
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Section Three: EU enlargement explained  
 
This section will briefly explain the EU enlargement process. This is necessary in order to 
better understand the case countries’ paths to accession and to place them in the larger context 
of Europeanization and EU integration.  
The criteria for accession in the EU – the Copenhagen criteria agreed upon in 1993 – are laid 
out in the Treaty of the European Union. These are: guaranteeing democracy and the rule of 
law, a functioning market economy, and the ability to implement the obligations of 
membership. Furthermore, there are 35 policy areas called chapters that form part of the body 
of rules of the EU – the “acquis communautaire” with which candidate countries need to 
comply in order to join. While the EU rules within the chapters are not negotiable, the 
conditions and the timeframe for adopting, implementing and enforcing the rules are 
determined on an individual basis. Within the negotiations other issues, such as financial and 
transitional arrangements are also discussed. The European Commission is the institution 
which monitors progress, gives guidance and provides regular reports on the accession 
process
1
. 
The accession process as defined by the EU consists of three main stages – designation of a 
candidate status, opening of formal negotiations to comply with accession criteria, and formal 
joining of the Union granted by decision of the EU Council reached unanimously. For the 
Western Balkans, however, there has been a special process set up – the stabilization and 
association process (SAP) – which aims to stabilize the countries, help in their transition to a 
market-based economy, promote regional cooperation, and eventually offer EU membership
2
. 
In addition, the SAP includes specific agreements (Stabilisation and Association Agreements) 
which are individually tailored to aspiring Balkan countries to establish a free trade area, 
mutual political objectives and economic cooperation
3
. Financial assistance is carried out 
through the framework of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) which was 
                                                             
1 The EU’s conditions for membership can be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-
membership/index_en.htm  
2 The steps towards membership in the EU can be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/steps-
towards-joining/index_en.htm  
3
 A description of the Stabilization and Association Agreement can be found here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/saa_en.htm  
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established in 2007 as the common instrument for funding and support for both potential and 
candidate countries. It replaced former instruments, such as Phare, ISPA and SAPARD
4
. 
The prospect of membership, the so-called “potential candidate” status is granted as a first 
step when a country sets on the road to become a candidate for EU accession
5
. The EU also 
puts considerable effort in promoting regional cooperation and guides the countries of the 
West Balkans towards membership. This cooperation includes addressing common 
challenges, for example, energy shortages, cross-border criminality, transport and 
infrastructure, pollution, etc. Other initiatives include public administration, environment, 
energy, justice and home affairs, and education
6
. 
Currently, Croatia has the status of an acceding country (to formally join the EU on 1 July 
2013). Candidate countries are the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia i Herzegovina have the status 
of potential candidates
7
.  
                                                             
4
 Description of the IPA can be found here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/ipa_en.htm  
5 The steps towards membership in the EU can be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/steps-
towards-joining/index_en.htm 
6 Regional cooperation within the enlargement process is explained here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/regional-cooperation/index_en.htm  
7
 The current status of aspiring states can be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/check-
current-status/index_en.htm  
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Section Four: Case Study Analysis 
Bosnia i Herzegovina 
This chapter will go in depth in the first case of Bosnia i Herzegovina and will analyze to 
what extent the country’s domestic costs for rule compliance are affected by ethnicity and the 
legacies of civil war. In the case of Bosnia, this chapter will illustrate how the persistent 
ethnic tensions within the country and the inability of state and international institutions to 
reach political consensus on the domestic level have been the reasons behind the protracted 
offer for a candidate status. This section will firstly give a brief overview of the political 
developments in Bosnia since the end of the war in the mid-1990s and the relations with the 
EU within the democratization process. The second section will look into the presence of 
ethnopolitics as a factor determining the degree of membership in the EU by analyzing the EC 
progress reports between 2006 and 2012. The third section will analyze the relationship 
between Bosnia and the ICTY by again looking at the EC Progress Reports from the same 
period, and will evaluate whether this relationship played a role in the delay in offering a 
candidate status to Bosnia. 
Bosnia’s road to Europe  
Bosnia’s road to democracy and to Europe began with the signing of the Dayton Peace 
Accords which put an end to the war in Bosnia lasting between 1992 and 1995. The country 
was divided into two entities: a Croat-Bosniak Federation (Federation of Bosnia i 
Herzegovina) taking up 51% of the country’s territory, and the Serb Republic called 
Republika Srpska with the remaining 49% (Belloni, 2009, pp. 358-9).  
The Dayton Agreement created the basis of the Bosnian consociational democracy. This 
translates into power sharing among political elites, proportionality in government, veto rights 
guarantees, and communal autonomy. Thus, the result was “a complex institutional structure 
composed of one state, two entities, three peoples, an estimated 3.9 million citizens, and five 
layers of governance led by 14 prime ministers and governments, making Bosnia the state 
with the highest number of presidents, prime ministers, and ministers per capita in the entire 
world” (Belloni, 2009, pp. 359). While the consociational system was necessary to convince 
the warring parties to put down their weapons, it has later created space for intense 
competition which largely undermines interethnic compromise (Belloni, 2009, p. 360). This 
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complexity has resulted in no electoral or political incentives to cooperate between the three 
ethnic groups, nor any integrative elements, such as common institutions (Tzifakis, 2012, p. 
132).  
In addition, within Dayton, an Office of the High Representative (OHR) was set up in order to 
monitor the civilian aspects of the settlement and their implementation. The OHR 
increasingly attained more legislative and political powers, called the Bonn powers, in 1997 
(Belloni, 2009, pp. 359). These powers allowed taking action against persons who violate the 
legal commitments under the Dayton Peace Agreement, or its implementation. The Bonn 
powers were used more than 800 times over the following ten years. As a result, the 
international mission was transformed from providing assistance to the parties on the local 
level into an international protectorate (Belloni, 2009, p. 362).  
Ever since 2000, when the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) for Bosnia i 
Herzegovina was launched by the EU and strengthened during the European Council meeting 
in Thessaloniki in 2003 (Juncos, 2012, p. 58), the Union has gradually transformed Bosnia’s 
peace process to reflect the country’s European integration (Tzifakis, 2012, p. 132). The 
promise of future membership became the crucial turning point in the European Union’s 
strategy for the West Balkans, and in particular for Bosnia, where the EU sought not only 
security through Europeanization, but also improving its reputation after failing to stop the 
war in the early 1990s (Juncos, 2012, p. 58). The final round of reforms before the signing of 
the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) began in 2005, and the SAA was signed 
in June 2008.  The SAA, however, has not entered into force yet (Commission Progress 
Report on Bosnia i Herzegovina, 2012, p. 4). In 2008, the Commission (EC) presented a 
roadmap for visa liberalization for Bosnian citizens. In 2010 the EC recommended that the 
latter be exempt from the need to have a visa to enter the EU (Tzifakis, 2012, p. 136). In 
terms of economic assistance, between 2001 and 2009 Bosnia received 729 million Euros 
from the EU under the CARDS programme and the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistane 
(IPA) for economic development, cross-border cooperation, institution building and 
reconstruction (Tzifakis, 2012, p. 136). For 2012, 107,8 million Euros in financial assistance 
were allocated to Bosnia
8
.   
                                                             
8
 Retrieved April 15 2013, from the European Commission Enlargement website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/funding-by-country/bosnia-herzegovina/index_en.htm  
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Democratization through the enlargement process in South-East Europe has come to be 
accepted as a peace-building project, whereby the idea that enlargement is the best tool to 
promote domestic reforms remains largely unchanged. The case of Bosnia, however, with its 
lack of progress in adopting the reforms, poses a challenge to the power of Europe to 
transform societies on their road to democratization (Juncos, 2012, p. 59-60). The following 
section will look at Bosnia’s democratization process by examining evidence from Freedom 
House’s Nations in Transit report and Amnesty International’s annual report on the country.  
Democratic development has been measured extensively by Freedom House in the 
comparative study of 29 countries’ democratic development in Central Europe and Eurasia 
called “Nations in Transit”. Its latest edition measuring democratic success in 2011 portrays 
the countries of the Balkans as stalling in terms of critical reforms and a backslide in some 
key governance indicators
9
. Bosnia is designated a Transitional Government or Hybrid 
Regime with a democracy score of 4.36 (Freedom House, 2012).  
The Freedom House report on Bosnia i Herzegovina from 2012 (reflecting scores from 2011) 
portrays a rather grim picture. According to the findings, the democratic score of Bosnia was 
at its best in 2007 and has been deteriorating slightly in the years since. And while the overall 
score in 2012 is better than in 2003, according to the report, political elites in Bosnia still lack 
a common vision for the future of the country and no domestic political consensus exists. 
What is more, the situation has further deteriorated because of the political deadlock 
following the elections in October 2010, whereby as a result no democratic reforms or 
progress towards EU and NATO membership took place in the following year (Freedom 
House, 2012). 
Amnesty International’s annual report on Bosnia i Herzegovina reveals similar results. The 
organization which monitors respect for human rights across the world also attributes the 
October 2010 elections to the continuous and pertaining nationalist rhetoric taking place in 
the country. War crimes prosecution continued but according to the report progress remained 
generally slow while civilian war victims were still being denied access to reparations and 
justice
10
, resulting in undermining democratic consolidation.  
                                                             
9 Description of methodology and findings of the Nations in Transit reports can be found here: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2012  
10
 Amnesty International’s Annual Report on Bosnia from 2011 can be found here: 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/bosnia-herzegovina/report-2011  
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Ethnopolitics in Bosnia – multiplied by three 
On the background of Bosnia’s democratization process this section will examine the role of 
ethnopolitics in the internal political environment and how that translates in the EU’s 
conditionality for membership and the (eventual) upgrade in Bosnia’s EU membership status.  
When it comes to ethnic diversity, it is important to point out from the outset that whether a 
country is divided on ethnic lines needs to be complemented by how it is divided – the depth 
of the divisions and the extent to which they have spilled over into the domain of politics 
(Coakley, 2009, p. 265). In that sense, when talking about Bosnia, its constitution dating from 
the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995 which has identified the three ethnic groups as the only 
legitimate “constituent peoples” and has divided the country into entities based on ethnic 
identity (Belloni, 2009, p. 360), it is hard to separate ethnicity from politics in the country. It 
can be argued that the international administration with its far-reaching legislative and 
executive powers has further politicized ethnicity. The international community has viewed 
nationalist political parties as corrupt because they represent and negotiate on behalf of an 
ethnic constituency, and that is perceived as conflicting with public interest. However, this is 
in fact the essence of the politics of representation and it is inevitable that elected politicians 
are a reflection of social divisions (Chandler, 2006, p. 96-97).  
Because of the institutional settlement which almost exclusively depends on international 
supervision, the positions of national elites have been weakened, there is insecurity on all 
sides, there is no local control or ownership of the process, and eventually no trust in public 
institutions (Chandler, 2006, p. 97). In such a climate, the persistent popularity of ethnic 
political parties is not surprising. But does that presence have an effect on the accession 
process and the degree of Bosnia’s EU membership? And what has been the EU’s leverage in 
the country’s development? The next sections will lay out the political landscape in Bosnia 
since Dayton, will investigate the role of the EU on the domestic political environment, and 
by using data from the EC progress reports will analyze whether and to what extent 
ethnopolitics has affected Bosnia’s prospects of membership in the European Union.  
Bosnia – the political landscape  
Nine months after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords the first post-war elections took 
place whereby each ethnic group had its representative party, which controlled nearly all 
sectors of society, win decisively in its corresponding region. The Serb Democratic Party 
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(SDS) was dominating in Republika Srpska, the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) had 
its power base in Herceg-Bosna (areas with Croat majority), and the Party of Democratic 
Action (SDA) had its grip on the areas with Bosniak majority. The victory in the first 
elections of each of these parties resulted in the same parties responsible for the war 
remaining in power and retaining their ethno-nationalist agendas (Gromes, 2009, p. 97).  
The post-war internal political environment of Bosnia has been problematic for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, the presence of political forces based on ethnic identity 
results in a complex power sharing arrangement, including the entity veto (blocking of 
institutions based on “national interests” of the three ethnic groups). These have become 
enormous obstacles for decision-making in Bosnia and for pushing reforms in the context of 
European integration (Incentives for democratization, 2011, p. 1806).  Since Dayton, the 
entity veto has been used to stop legal proposals and the Republika Srpska has been the actor 
most prone to pursuing its own ethno-national interest by invoking its right of the veto, and 
instigating antagonistic politics and polarization (Dzihic, Wieser, 2011, p. 1811).  
Secondly, frequent elections following the Dayton Agreement have failed to substantially 
diminish the influence of ethnic political parties (Dzihic, Wieser, 2011, p. 1806-7). 
Throughout the following decade, the influence of the main parties has diminished to a certain 
extent thanks to the international peacekeeping mission and its efforts in this regard (Gromes, 
2009, p. 100). While in 1996 the SDA, SDS and HDZ received altogether 36 out of 42 seats 
in the Bosnian House of Representatives, this number was diminished to 15 in 2006 (Gromes, 
2009, p. 101). Nevertheless, politicians in Bosnia still use nationalist rhetoric rather than 
discourse on the country’s common future as an EU member state, thus illustrating the lack of 
interethnic dialogue, limited opportunities for reconciliation and a “politics of fear” (Brijavac, 
2011, p. 404). What complicates the situation is that these parties cannot be rejected, since 
they were democratically elected by citizens (Brijavac, 2011, p. 404). 
Lastly, while institution-building and formal rules have taken place, implementation has been 
overlooked and the unwillingness of local elites to implement reforms has resulted in very 
limited success. All of these have had negative effects on EU rule compliance in the country 
(Dzihic, Wieser, 2011, p. 1806-7).  
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Bosnia and Brussels  
Throughout the post-war years all of the main political parties have presumably begun to 
commit to the final aim of accession to the European Union. However, this has largely 
remained rhetoric and has increased tension in the country (Dzihic, Wieser, 2011, p. 1812). 
The problem can be illustrated as a zero-sum game, whereby nationalist elites are elected 
because of support from their respective groups and there is no incentive to introduce cross-
ethnic appeals. Furthermore, without such incentives for cooperation, popularity is achieved 
through the defense of the national group and through presenting others as enemies (Belloni, 
2009, p. 360).  
The situation described above has resulted in the EU’s substantial focus on consensus politics 
which entails that political leaders need to show commitment to engage in a constructive 
dialogue with one another before the country can be considered for an upgrade in its accession 
status (Vasilev, 2011, p. 53). The consensus principle is not part of the Copenhagen criteria 
but rather an ad hoc principle that the EU has had to develop to address the contingencies of 
some Balkan countries (Vasilev, 2011, p. 54). However, the EU has largely failed to promote 
consensus among the biggest domestic parties (Juncos, 2012, p. 70), which has kept the costs 
for rule compliance high enough for political leaders to prefer retaining the status quo.  
Among reasons for the EU’s failure to allure leaders in Bosnia to accept the domestic costs 
for rule adoption has been because of very limited instant rewards (Tzifakis, 2012, p. 139). 
Furthermore, when rewards are given, they are the result of limited or partial compliance, 
which makes full compliance even less appealing (Tzifakis, 2012, p. 139). This is best 
exemplified in the process of opening the negotiations for a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA) in 2005 which depended on the completion of a number of reforms in the 
police sector. However, negotiations started after insufficient agreement between the ethnic 
leaderships and postponement of the most contentious issues for future discussions (Tzifakis, 
2012, p. 140-1). In 2008 the SAA was signed even though Bosnia had not advanced in any 
substantial way the pending issues in the separate entities regarding police matters (Tzifakis, 
2012, p. 141). The next section will closely investigate the developments in Bosnia’s 
accession process.  
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The EC Progress Reports: 2006-2012 
The European Commission Progress Reports have been the most comprehensive accounts for 
the level of democratization of aspiring countries in the Balkans. After tracing the presence of 
ethnic tensions as hampering the EU integration process, a number of issues emerge which 
serve as evidence that ethnopolitics do have an effect on the Europeanization and the 
membership status of Bosnia. They can be grouped into three main themes – the Constitution 
problem, the coordination between State and Entity levels, and ethno-nationalist and 
secessionist rhetoric.  
Bosnia’s Constitution dating from the Dayton Peace Agreement does not allow citizens who 
are not part of one of the three official groups (Croat, Serb or Bosniak) to stand as candidates 
for the Presidency and the House of Peoples in the Parliamentary Assembly. The European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has found this unconstitutional (EC, Bosnia, 2012, p. 8). 
Since 2006 there have been four separate attempts to amend the constitution but all of them 
have been unsuccessful because of widespread disagreement between the political actors on 
what the constitutional reform should entail (EC, Bosnia, 2007, p. 7). The latest attempt was 
in October 2011 when an Interim Joint Parliamentary Committee had to draft amendments to 
comply with the ruling of the ECtHR in relation to discriminating on the grounds of ethnic 
belonging. A Roadmap was produced which conditioned the entry into force of the SAA, and 
thus an upgrade in the EU membership status, on meeting the conditions. Yet, the first 
deadline in August 2012 was not met (EC, Bosnia, 2012, p. 8).  
Fragmented policy-making among the State and the Entities (the Federation and Republika 
Srpska (RS)) has been a major issue ever since Dayton and has figured prominently since the 
first Progress Reports. The RS government has been continuously opposed to transferring 
new competencies to the State level, including in the SAA context (EC, Bosnia, 2009, p. 8). 
Obstructionist motions have taken place “towards State-level laws, including European 
Partnership requirements, in particular by members from the Republika Srpska” (EC, Bosnia, 
2009, p. 9). At the same time, the RS established in 2010 an EU Integration Unit in almost all 
of its ministries and continued to successfully harmonize its own legislation with European 
standards. The Federation, by contrast, has been less successful because of the complex ethnic 
interests which have affected governance on the Entity level (EC, Bosnia, 2010, p. 11). 
Throughout 2011 as well the Parliamentary Assemblies on Entity level have continued to 
function well (EC, Bosnia, 2011, p. 8). However, the EU’s requirements for strong State-level 
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governance and the lack of positive developments in this realm have led the Commission to 
use more pressing language: “An effective coordination mechanism […] remains to be 
established as a matter of urgency regarding EU matters and the harmonization of EU related 
legislation” (EC, Bosnia, 2011, p. 10). Even so, no major developments on this issue have 
ensued since.   
Finally, nationalist rhetoric coming from the main political leaders of all three constituent 
groups has been common and the most fervent discourse has come from the RS who have 
continuously claimed self-determination rights for their Entity (EC, Bosnia, 2008, p.7). On 
the other hand, politicians from the Federation have questioned the existence of the RS while 
claiming that the latter is “the result of genocide” (EC, Bosnia, 2009, p. 8). The Parliamentary 
Assembly’s work has also been “adversely affected by intransigent and ethnically oriented 
positions” by various political leaders (EC, Bosnia, 2009, p. 9). In 2010, in light of the 
coming elections in October of that year, the tendency of parties on all sides to stick to 
nationalistic rhetoric was reinforced and while RS politicians challenged the integrity of the 
State, leaders from the Federation frequently related the establishment of the RS to war-time 
massacres (EC, Bosnia, 2010, p. 8). Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that in the last two 
reports from 2011 and 2012, there is no mentioning of nationalistic rhetoric in the entire 
reports, pointing to the fact that even though ethnic tension continued to be present, its 
presence in political discourse diminished. However, this has not resulted in any motions on 
the part of the EU to upgrade Bosnia’s membership status, therefore, leading to the 
assumption that its importance is limited.  
The ICTY and EU membership 
The ICTY was established in 1993 with two UN Security Council resolutions under Chapter 
VII of the United Nations Charter. According to Gow (2006), the Tribunal is “perhaps the 
most ambitious of the precedent-setting initiatives arising from the international involvement 
in the dissolving Yugoslavia” (p. 56). This section will analyze the relationship between 
Bosnia and the ICTY in the context of European integration.  
Bosnia and the ICTY 
In the Bosnia i Herzegovina context, opinions on the effectiveness of the ICTY vary widely. 
Some believe that it was because of the Tribunal’s actions in removing directly certain figures 
from the political scene that progress in Bosnia since the mid 1990s has been possible at all 
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(Gow, 2006, p. 62). Others have been much more critical, claiming that “the international 
community has expressly and purposefully hindered the post-war reconstruction and 
development of BiH, Croatia and Serbia because of supposed failures to fully accommodate 
the demands of the ICTY” (Hayden, 2011, p. 315).  
Public opinion about the Tribunal among Bosnians is also diverse. An opinion poll in 2002 in 
Bosnia found that 4% of people in the Republika Srpska trusted the ICTY, and it had the trust 
of 51% in the Croat-Muslim region (Hayden, 2011, p. 317). The relationship between the 
Muslim community and the ICTY is particularly important, as it has pre-determined on 
numerous occasions compliance with its demands. At first, the Tribunal was perceived as an 
ally of the Muslim community, as the latter generally assumed that the prosecuted would be 
Serbs responsible for committing atrocities in the war. However, the ICTY also issued 
indictments against perpetrators of Muslim origin who committed crimes against Serb 
detainees which was incomprehensible for Bosnian Muslims because of their conviction that 
their nation was the victim of genocide (Saxon, 2006, p. 563). This has made the ICTY a 
“mixed bag” for the Muslim community – on one hand “a beacon of hope” to restore justice, 
and on the other, “a confusing source of legal judgments and decisions that appear to have 
little relevance to the actual experiences, perceptions, and feelings of the Muslim community” 
(Saxon, 2006, p. 564).  
ICTY and Brussels  
The relationship between Bosnians and the ICTY, and their compliance with the EU’s 
conditions to cooperate fully with the Tribunal’s prescriptions are an important indicator for 
dealing with civil war legacies on the road to Europe, and the related costs for compliance in 
reaching the end goal. Handling the legacy of war crimes was seen as critical for fulfilling the 
ambitions of Bosnia to fully integrate in the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) of 
the EU (Kerr, 2005, p. 326). However, regarding the explicit link that the EU created between 
accession progress and cooperation with the ICTY, the EU has been quite inconsistent. 
Firstly, while cooperation with the Tribunal was required, no similar attention was given to 
developing transitional justice mechanisms on the domestic level. These incomplete policies 
have challenged the level of support for EU accession and thus the political costs for 
compliance (Tzifakis, 2012, p. 139). Secondly, it was unclear what the exact criteria are for 
determining compliance, and thus the progress threshold toward SAP. The EU declared that 
the Prosecutor of the ICTY needs to assure that full cooperation is taking place, but what the 
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Prosecutor might deem to comprise full cooperation was not clearly spelled out (Kerr, 2005, 
p. 327).  
Nevertheless, the EU’s emphasis on cooperation in war crimes issues as a condition for 
accession, has turned this process into not only a symbol of reform, but also “a catalyst for 
further progress toward the building of a society based on the rule of law and respect for 
human rights” (Kerr, 2007, p. 380). The main obstacle to cooperation has been the strong 
opposition of the RS entity whereby not a single person was detained or transferred to The 
Hague by the RS authorities until January 2005. This has led NATO to identify the RS as 
Bosnia’s “single largest problem” thereby obstructing further integration both into NATO and 
EU structures (Kerr, 2005, p. 327).  
Clear evidence of how progress in cooperation with the Tribunal leads to progress in the EU 
accession process took place in 2004-2005. In 2004 two formal apologies were issued by the 
RS government acknowledging that the “nine July days of the Srebrenica tragedy are a black 
page in the history of the Serb people” (Kerr, 2007, p. 382). In the beginning of 2005 a 
number of former officials were transferred to The Hague for trial whereby at the same time 
the President of the RS pronounced that the “Road to Brussels goes only through The Hague” 
(Kerr, 2007, p. 382-3). Furthermore, in March 2005 a War Crimes Chamber was inaugurated 
in Sarajevo, which meant that cases could also take place in Bosnia. These signs of progress 
were welcomed by the EU and it led the way to open the Stability and Association 
negotiations in November 2005 (Kerr, 2007, p. 382-3).  
The EC Progress Reports: 2006-2012 
The EC Progress Reports have also substantially covered the issue of cooperation with the 
ICTY. This cooperation has been traced in the annual reports under the section Regional 
issues and international obligations. A number of themes emerge in the context of the 
accession process. 
In general, Bosnia has been cooperating quite well with the Tribunal. While in 2006 the 
Federation was cooperating on a satisfactory level but the RS was not yet sufficiently 
cooperative (EC, Bosnia, 2006, p. 18), in the following years cooperation “has progressed” 
(EC, Bosnia, 2007, p. 20) and is “generally satisfactory in most areas” (EC, Bosnia, 2012, p. 
21). The behaviour of the RS has caused a number of drawbacks. For example, in 2008 the 
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ICTY declared that the RS failed to take the necessary actions to re-arrest a war criminal who 
had escaped from prison in 2007 (EC, Bosnia, 2008, p. 22). Furthermore, in 2009 the 
Commission pointed to political leadership in the RS challenging the credibility of war-time 
massacres which involved civilians, and deemed such rhetoric “unacceptable and deeply 
worrying” (EC, Bosnia, 2009, p. 21).  
Nevertheless, the general trend in complying with ICTY prescriptions has been positive. 
Notable developments have included the arrests of Radovan Karadzic and Stojan Zupljanin in 
2008 (EC, Bosnia, 2008, p. 21), the adoption of the National War Crimes Strategy in 2009 
(EC, Bosnia, 2009, p. 21) and the re-arrest of the escaped war criminal Radovan Stankovic in 
January 2012 (2012, p. 21). Another development deemed significant by the European 
Commission in the Progress Reports has been the international cooperation between Bosnian, 
Croatian and Serbian prosecutors for exchanging evidence and transferring some war crimes 
cases (EC, Bosnia, 2009, p. 22). Bilateral agreements on mutual execution of sentences 
regarding criminal matters and court ruling enforcement were signed in 2010, which has been 
pointed out as a positive development (EC, Bosnia, 2010, p. 22). Bilateral agreements have 
expanded to include all former Yugoslavian countries in 2012 but these have not included war 
crimes cases (EC, Bosnia, 2012, p. 21).  
Last but not least, throughout the reports, various conditions have been stressed at different 
times as crucial conditions for furthering the accession process. In 2007 it was clearly stated 
that the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) would require full 
cooperation with the Tribunal. In 2009 the arrest of Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic “remains 
the Tribunal’s priority” (EC, Bosnia, 2009, p. 21). Another requirement has been the sharing 
of information and evidence in cases regarding war crimes between Bosnia and Serbia, which 
“has yet to be signed”. The Commission has designated this to “represent a significant step 
forward in terms of regional cooperation and the fight against impunity” (EC, Bosnia, 2012, 
p. 21).  
Overall, with time, the amount of space dedicated to evaluating the cooperation of Bosnia 
with the ICTY within the Progress Reports has been declining, with no major issues pending 
with this EU condition. Bosnia seems to have been putting substantial efforts to not only 
assist the ICTY but also to develop local and regional capacities to indict war criminals. Even 
with the often obstructionist actions of the RS, progress appears to be evaluated as generally 
good and satisfactory.  
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Conclusion 
 
The above analysis points to the fact that ethnopolitics has played a substantial role in the 
delay of Bosnia’s upgrade in membership status. The problem of the Bosnian Constitution, 
which institutionalizes ethnicity as a prerequisite for citizenship, has persisted and has 
become a direct impediment to the country’s EU membership process. The weak decision-
making on the state level and nationalistic rhetoric have also been obstacles in the accession 
process. Cooperation with the ICTY, however, has been rather smooth and while it is a 
condition for membership, Bosnia has generally complied with it and this has not constituted 
a reason for delaying the upgrade in EU membership status.  
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Serbia 
This chapter will analyze the case of Serbia and the extent to which the country’s domestic 
costs for rule compliance are affected by ethnicity and the legacies of civil war. The chapter 
will illustrate how in the case of Serbia relations with the ICTY combined with persistent 
nationalism have been the root cause for high domestic costs for rule compliance. This section 
will first give a brief overview of the political developments in Serbia throughout the 1990s 
and following the fall of Slobodan Milosevic, and the democratization process. The second 
section will look into the internal political environment, which in this case is dominated by 
nationalistic politics, as a factor determining the degree of membership in the EU by 
analyzing the EC progress reports between 2005 and 2012. The third section will analyze the 
relationship between Serbia and the ICTY by again looking at the EC Progress Reports from 
the same period, and will evaluate whether this direct legacy of civil war affected a delay in 
upgrading Serbia’s membership status. 
Serbia’s road to Europe  
Serbia’s development since the late 1980s until 2000 has been marked by the leadership of 
Slobodan Milosevic. Enjoying broad popular support and populist legitimacy, Milosevic 
mobilized a movement based entirely on nationalist sentiments and a general formula of “all 
Serbs living in one state” (Zakosek, 2008, p. 593). His party, the Serbian Socialist Party (SPS), 
was a mix of communist ideology combined with a highly personalized power structure 
(Zakosek, 2008, p. 595).  The failure of his expansionist programme, the war costs and the 
economic embargo, however, substantially weakened his popular legitimacy. The failure to 
win the war in Kosovo, demonstrated by NATO’s bombing of Belgrade and the establishment 
of a UN mission in Kosovo in 1999, led to the ousting of Milosevic in presidential elections in 
2000 (Zakosek, 2008, p. 597), followed by his extradition to face trial in The Hague at the 
ICTY in June 2001 (Zakosek, 2008, p. 596). 
Following a period of “blocked transformation” (Lazic, Vuletic, 2009, p.988) in the 1990s, 
the transition to democracy for Serbia essentially began in 2000 (Zakosek, 2008, p. 597). A 
new economic elite came into existence that was the result of the unification of the opposition 
parties against Milosevic (Lazic, Vuletic, 2009, p.988). The country’s new constitution was 
adopted in 2006, putting the party system in a more stable phase. However, this system has 
been dominated by political themes rather than economic-social ones, instability of the 
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electoral base, and leadership ambitions of the party leaders to accumulate power (Orlovic, 
2008, p. 208). 
An important political process largely defining Serbia’s policies until 2006 has been the issue 
of its union with Montenegro. In 1992 Yugoslavia transformed into the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) comprised of Serbia and Montenegro (Macek-Mackova, 2011, p. 620). 
The two entities nurtured “mutually exclusive ambitions”, leading to aspirations on the side of 
Montenegro for the creation of two independent states (Macek-Mackova, 2011, p. 620). 
Following a referendum in Montenegro in 2001, with the assistance of the EU, the two 
entities signed the so-called Belgrade Agreement creating the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro which came into effect in 2003 (Macek-Mackova, 2011, p. 620-1). However, the 
two governments of the separate republics had different conceptions of what policies are 
required in order to achieve political and economic progress (Macek-Mackova, 2011, p. 621). 
Similar to the situation in Bosnia, the two elites in this consociational arrangement were 
sticking to their sides instead of negotiating and there were never-ending debates causing 
constant competition among them (Macek-Mackova, 2011, p. 625). In 2006 there was another 
referendum in Montenegro, resulting in the establishment of two separate states (Macek-
Mackova, 2011, p. 621). 
The democratic development of Serbia has also been measured in Freedom House’s Nations 
in Transit Report. In the 2012 report Serbia’s overall score is 3.64 and it is classified as semi-
consolidated democracy (Freedom House, 2012). In the report specific attention has been 
placed on Serbia’s compliance with EU accession requirements, stressing the importance of 
arrests of war criminals for furthering negotiations, and the stumbling blocks for Serbia’s 
membership in the EU, namely with regards to Kosovo. Within the different sections, Serbia’s 
scores have remained the same for the past two years and slightly better than in 2010. At the 
same time, important shortfalls have been mentioned, such as the ongoing conflict between 
two of the main parties challenging governmental stability in 2011, and the decline in living 
standards, coupled with issues of transparency in financing of political parties (Freedom 
House, 2012, p. 476).  
In its 2012 Annual Report on Serbia, Amnesty International also puts emphasis on Serbia’s 
EU related developments, particularly the transfer of war criminals to The Hague, and the 
country’s postponed candidacy for EU membership because of failure to commit to imposed 
obligations. The failed talks with Kosovo regarding customs agreements and the subsequent 
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violence resulting in a political crisis in Serbia have been noted as negative developments and 
a case in point
11
. 
On this background, Serbia’s political landscape within the last two decades has been 
characterized by two main issues, which have also been its stumbling blocks on the road to 
EU membership: the “Kosovo” question and cooperation with the ICTY (Orlovic, p. 206). 
The next section will describe in detail the situation with Kosovo and the nationalistic 
tendencies in the country, and the implications these have for Serbia’s EU membership in 
terms of increased or diminished costs for rule compliance.  
Ethnopolitics in Serbia – nationalism and ethnicity 
When it comes to Serbia, politics based on ethnic belonging have been combined with 
nationalistic policies throughout the past two decades. Regarding the former, within the 
context of the Montenegro question, ethnic identification was seen as very political: “the way 
one identified defined one’s stand on independence” (Macek-Mackova, 2011, p. 624). 
Furthermore, the increasing ethnic character of the dispute between Serbia and Montenegro 
after 2003 caused political leaders to barricade themselves in their republican institutions, 
with no coordination regarding economic or financial matters (Macek-Mackova, 2011, p. 
624). Nationalist sentiments are continuing even today, to a large extent as a result of the 
unresolved Kosovo issue (Lazic, Vuletic, 2009, p. 989). Therefore, while acknowledging that 
nationalism does not entirely fit into the definition of ethnopolitics but rather complements it, 
it will be analyzed here, as it is an essential characteristic of Serbia’s development and its 
success (or failure) to progress in the EU accession process. The following section will 
examine how ethnopolitics and nationalism translate in the internal political environment of 
Serbia. 
The political landscape 
As mentioned above, the unresolved status of Kosovo has been the bone of contention 
regarding Serbia’s democratization process ever since the 1999 NATO bombings. Striking an 
agreement on the conditions of power sharing and supervision between the political 
leadership of Kosovo and the international community, the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) set the tone for Kosovo’s future independence (Liotta, 2010, 
                                                             
11
 Amnesty International’s Annual Report on Serbia from 2011 can be found here: 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/serbia/report-2012  
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p. 84). In 2006 a new constitution was introduced in Serbia, which declared that Kosovo was 
an inalienable part of Serbia (Ramet, 2011, p. 274), again invoking nationalist sentiments. 
Kosovo declared independence in 2008 and requested international supervision in the face of 
the EU and continued NATO presence (Gowan, 2008, p. 1). However, even after the 
declaration of independence, Serbia has continued to claim sovereignty over Kosovo (Ramet, 
2011, p. 282). This has even led to Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica withdrawing 
ambassadors from states that recognized Kosovo which has induced plentiful criticism both 
from the EU and the US (Gowan, 2008, p. 7). 
Another notable feature of Serbia’s internal political environment has been the persistent 
divisions among the political elites and their diverging policies. Already in the 1990s the 
democratic opposition was divided because of internal struggles, essentially helping 
Milosevic stay in power. After a brief moment of unity, whereby Milosevic was ousted, the 
democratic coalition (DOS) failed to survive and old rivalries among the different parties re-
emerged. Dilemmas of statehood have “left scars and identity problems among the democratic 
parties” resulting in some of them to define themselves in nationalist terms (Massari, 2010, p. 
264). Furthermore, the legacy of the Milosevic regime and the urgency that was required to 
deal with it also induced deep divisions regarding the pace and direction of the reforms 
(Massari, 2010, p. 264).  
How do these characteristics of Serbia’s political environment translate and resonate in the 
country’s EU membership process? The next section will analyze the relationship between 
Serbia and the EU in the context of the accession process. 
Serbia and Brussels  
Two issues, already described above, resulting from ethnic and nationalist sentiments, have 
been major obstacles to Serbia’s EU integration – the relationship with Montenegro until 
partition, and the Kosovo issue. Regarding the first, the main obstacle for the EU was that it 
did not face one single negotiating partner but rather was confronted with two actors voicing 
opposite views (Massari, 2010, p. 263). Initially, the EU warned that if the two entities would 
split, this would be “a slower train to the EU” (Macek-Mackova, 2011, p. 627). After initially 
being reluctant to acknowledge the disagreement between the entities on major issues, such as 
economic harmonization, the EU finally accepted a “twin-track” principle with separated 
negotiations regarding the economic aspects of the SAA process (Massari, 2010, p. 263).  
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Regarding Kosovo in the conditionality framework, Serbia and the EU have assumed 
different positions – while Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo is quite straightforward, the 
EU’s stance is more complicated (Obradovic-Wochnik, Wochnik, 2012, p. 1159). The EU’s 
leverage on the Serbia-Kosovo relationship is limited because there is no consensus among 
EU member states about the status of Kosovo, which can be exploited by Serbia by being 
framed as ”unclear demands and a lack of credibility” (Obradovic-Wochnik, Wochnik, 2012, 
p. 1160). Furthermore, the questions of Kosovo, and EU membership have occupied polarized 
standpoints and trajectories in Serbian politics, whereby on Kosovo Serbia’s “no recognition” 
policy is quite clear and enjoying domestic consent, while EU integration has not enjoyed 
such clear-cut agreement among the key political parties (Obradovic-Wochnik, Wochnik,, 
2012, p. 1160). 
It is important to point out that Serbia’s attitude regarding EU integration has not always been 
clear-cut until the arrival of a governing coalition with a pro-European stance in 2008. Since 
Milosevic was ousted, key Serbian parties have completely disagreed on EU integration, 
ranging from complete opposition to deeming it not a priority (Obradovic-Wochnik, 
Wochnik,, 2012, p. 1166). As late as 2004, Serbia was able to agree a resolution on EU 
consensus. Two of the major political parties, however, which together comprised almost 
40% of the electorate in the country – the Socialist party (SPS) and the Radical party (SRS) – 
did not agree on the resolution and refused to sign. The latter party’s leader even went as far 
as defining the EU as evil, leading to the conclusion that the war-time nationalist parties have 
largely remained unreformed (Massari, 2010, p. 264).  
In addition, while the EU has made substantial effort to establish that Serbia’s accession is not 
dependent on recognition of Kosovo, an interesting development took place whereby the 
signing of the SAA with Serbia – a big step in the accession process – came a few months 
after Kosovo declared independence, even though at this time Serbia failed to comply with 
ICTY conditionality. This has resulted in the perceived notion among the Serb population that 
this was a sort of concession to pressure Serbia to recognize Kosovo, and a trade-off – 
“Europe for Kosovo” (Obradovic-Wochnik, Wochnik, 2012, p. 1164).  
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In 2010 the process of ratification of the SAA began and in March 2012 Serbia received an 
upgrade in its EU status and became a candidate country
12
. In latest developments, on 19 
April 2013 Serbia and Kosovo signed an EU-brokered agreement called “First Agreement of 
Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations” (Human Rights Watch, 2013). This has 
resulted in the European Commission statement of 22 April 2013 recommending opening EU 
membership talks with Serbia. The EC’s decision was justified by claiming that “Serbia had 
taken very significant steps and sustainable improvement in relations with Kosovo” 
(European Commission, 2013).    
The next section will go more in depth regarding the EC’s Progress Reports on Serbia and 
will analyze to what extent the issues with ethno- and nationalistic politics have become 
stumbling blocks in Serbia’s EU accession process.  
The EC Progress Reports  
The analysis of the EC Progress Reports on Serbia from the period 2005-2012 will be carried 
out with a specific focus on ethnopolitics. The analysis seeks to establish whether the 
presence of ethnopolitics has affected Serbia’s degree of EU membership. Analysis reveals 
that, overall, the presence of ethno- or nationalistic politics has not hampered substantially the 
EU accession process. While developments have been thoroughly reported by the EC, they 
have not formed essential conditions whose fulfillment would bring (or hamper) an upgrade 
in degree of EU membership. 
From the first report in 2005, the EC has identified that incidents against minorities across 
Serbia, including in the autonomous province of Vojvodina, have occurred but they have not 
been the result of deliberate government policy (EC, Serbia, 2005, p.21-22). In 2007 the 
report claimed that ethnically motivated incidents have decreased, with the situation 
improving in the Vojvodina region, and general stability in Southern Serbia. However, the 
same report notes about incidents involving incitement and offensive language in the media, 
the tension between ethnic Albanians and the Serbian population in Southern Serbia, and 
deterioration in the situation in the Sandzak province because of divisions within the Muslim 
community (EC, Serbia, 2007, p. 15). These tensions continued throughout 2009 (EC, Serbia, 
2009, p. 18). In 2011 the Commission issued an Opinion on Serbia’s application for EU 
                                                             
12
 The status of all countries in the EU’s accession process can be found here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/check-current-status/index_en.htm 
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membership (EC, Serbia, 2011, p. 4), whereby the EC noted that religiously motivated 
incidents have decreased in numbers over the years (EC, Serbia, 2011, p. 26). In addition, the 
Opinion claimed that the situation in Vojvodina is “good and there has already been a further 
decrease in the limited number of incidents” (EC, Serbia, 2011, p. 30). In the latest report 
from 2012, the situation in both provinces was reported to be good and “stable overall” (EC, 
Serbia, 2012, p. 17). Serbia’s continuous problems with integrating the Roma population, 
with widespread marginalization and discrimination of the latter throughout the years (EC, 
Serbia, 2011, p. 32), while quite important as well, is beyond the scope of this paper.  
Another issue relating to ethno- and nationalistic politics is connected to the political 
landscape in Serbia. Two points are worth mentioning. Firstly, in the parliamentary elections 
from 2007, the 5% general threshold was removed for ethnic minority parties and this resulted 
in increasing the latter’s representation, leading to the conclusion that, unlike in Bosnia, 
ethnic political parties are encouraged to participate in parliament, and their presence is 
marked as a positive development (EC, Serbia, 2007, p. 6). In the 2008 elections out of 21 
political parties in parliament, four represented national minorities and constituted a 
parliamentary group (EC, Serbia, 2011, p. 10). Furthermore, in 2009 the Law on Political 
Parties was introduced, whereby ethnic minority parties were given an encouraging push by 
allowing fewer signatures for registration (EC, Serbia, 2009, p. 17). Following this law, a total 
number of 81 parties was registered, of which 45 were representing national minorities (EC, 
Serbia, 2011, p. 10). Secondly, throughout the years a political EU consensus has formed in 
Serbia but this has not been without its problems. The 2007 elections were marked by deep 
divisions and difficulties to reach an agreement on a common platform, and this political 
uncertainty impacted on the pace of adopting legislation (EC, Serbia, 2007, p. 7). In the 2008 
report the EC cited the use of “offensive and inflammatory language against political 
opponents” (EC, Serbia, 2008, p. 7), combined with ongoing disputes between opposing 
political parties, as the cause for the delays and inefficiency (EC, Serbia, 2008, p. 8). 
However, in 2010 the EC reported stability and “high degree of consensus on EU integration 
as a strategic priority” (EC, Serbia, 2010, p. 7). In 2012 progress went even further, as the 
results from the parliamentary and local elections in May of that year resulted in the Serbian 
Radical Party, opposing the European integration of Serbia, not reaching the threshold for 
entering the parliament (EC, Serbia, 2012, p. 6).  
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Regarding the Kosovo issue, it has been prominent in all progress reports throughout the 
period. Discussions have intensified since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 
whereby Serbia’s response has been to use “legal, diplomatic and peaceful means to contest 
the declaration” (EC, Serbia, 2008, p. 21). In the 2009 report the EC subtly implied that 
recognition of Kosovo by Serbia is crucial and the latter’s cooperation “on matters relating to 
Kosovo is a key European Partnership priority” (EC, Serbia, 2009, p. 21). The same line of 
rhetoric continued in 2010 as well: “the process of dialogue in itself would be a factor for 
peace, security and stability in the region, and that dialogue would be to promote cooperation, 
achieve progress on the path to the European Union and improve the lives of the people” (EC, 
Serbia, 2010, p. 18).  
In 2011 a number of violent outbreaks with casualties, combined with “frequent inflammatory 
rhetoric by the Serbian leadership” took place (EC, Serbia, 2011, p. 34). The EU’s demand for 
cooperation has been integrated into appeals to cooperate with EULEX, the EU rule of law 
mission in Kosovo (EC, Serbia, 2011, p. 34). In 2012 the EC contended that Serbia exhibited 
“some progress towards a visible and sustainable improvement in relations with Kosovo, the 
key priority set out in the Commission’s Opinion on Serbia’s membership application” (EC, 
Serbia, 2012, p. 19). Following the 2012 elections, the EU concluded that the new leadership 
in Serbia “needs to continue to engage constructively in the next phase of the dialogue in 
order to achieve further progress towards a visible and sustainable improvement of relations 
with Kosovo” (EC, Serbia, 2012, p. 19). However, recognition of Kosovo has never been 
explicitly stated as a condition for EU membership. The positive impact of the developments 
in April 2013 described above is expected to be noted in the 2013 EC Progress Report. 
The ICTY and EU membership 
This section will investigate Serbia’s record in dealing with legacies of civil war, in particular 
its relations with the ICTY in the context of conditionality for accession to the European 
Union. The first part will present background information, including the attitudes of Serbian 
society towards the Tribunal. The second part will investigate to what extent cooperation with 
the ICTY has become an explicit condition for EU membership, and the third part will 
analyze the EC Progress Reports and how the Serbia-ICTY cooperation, or lack thereof, has 
resonated in the Commission’s overall judgment of progress in the country.  
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Serbia and the ICTY 
As discussed earlier, the work of the Tribunal has been the subject of mixed feelings. On one 
hand, the court’s positive lessons, such as the creation of an independent judicial institution 
with its own mode of operation, has been important for former Yugoslavian countries in 
confronting the crimes committed by their own citizens (Zakosek, 2008, p. 604). This has 
essentially constituted dealing with the civil war legacies. On the other hand, among the 
failures of the Tribunal has been the “inability to explain and to communicate its activity to 
the citizens of the involved post-Yugoslav states” (Zakosek, 2008, p. 604). In the case of 
Serbia this is particularly relevant when discussing the attitudes of the local population 
towards the Tribunal.  
One of the most important characteristics of the Serbs’ perceptions towards the ICTY has its 
roots in Serb nationalism during the Yugoslav wars. After Milosevic was ousted the political 
elite channeled the nationalistic sentiments in a new direction, namely into opposition to the 
ICTY. The latter was then portrayed as “a political anti-Serb Tribunal” (Saxon, 2006, p. 566). 
Isabela Steflja (2010) calls this trend “defensive nationalism” which is comprised of “the 
denial syndrome, victimhood nationalism and the glorification of war criminals” (Steflja, 
2010, p. 235). This is best exemplified through public opinion polls. According to an opinion 
poll in 2002, only 8% of the population expressed “trust” in the ICTY (Freyberg-Inan, 
Spoerri, 2008,p. 358). A survey in 2002 showed that 80% of 1300 Serbs participating 
believed that the Tribunal was prosecuting Serbs more vigorously, and some 57% believed 
that the Tribunal was unjust. In a poll from 2003, only 12% of the Serb population supported 
the continuation of their government’s policy of extraditing suspected Serb war criminals to 
The Hague (Steflja, 2010, p. 240-1). In a 2006 poll, just about 15% of the population 
supported cooperation with the Tribunal “in order to achieve justice” (Freyberg-Inan, Spoerri, 
2008, p. 358).  
Furthermore, the ICTY has continuously been used and abused by anti-reform parties, 
particularly in times of elections when they capitalize on the public’s negativity towards the 
institution (Freyberg-Inan, Spoerri, 2008, p. 360). A framework frequently used by politicians 
to take advantage of the ICTY’s negative image in Serbia has been the perceived threat to 
national security fueled by the “collective experience of international conditionality and the 
threat of international isolation” (Freyberg-Inan, Spoerri, 2008, p. 362). The next section will 
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investigate the political conditionality posed by the EU regarding cooperation with the ICTY 
in the context of EU membership.  
ICTY and Brussels  
Cooperation with the ICTY has been identified by the EU as a key condition for Serbia’s 
membership in the Union. However, until 2008, when a pro-European government came into 
power, Serbia did not have a clear European strategy and this has largely resulted in slow or at 
times even non-existing cooperation with the ICTY (Obradovic-Wochnik, Wochnik, 2012, p. 
1166-7). The lack of consensus on the domestic level described in the previous section is also 
a direct result from the issue of cooperation with the ICTY, whereby pro-reform politicians 
were faced with a dilemma: if they do not comply with Tribunal-related conditions, this costs 
them support from abroad, but if they do, this can directly cost them support on the domestic 
level (Freyberg-Inan, Spoerri, 2008, p. 367). In 2005 many war crimes indictees arrived in 
The Hague on the principle of voluntary surrender and as a demonstration on the part of the 
Serbs of cooperation with the ICTY. This resumed cooperation also triggered the start of 
negotiations for the SAA (Orlovic, 2008, p. 216). By the same logic, however, the 
negotiations were suspended in 2006 because of lack of cooperation with the Tribunal 
(Orlovic, 2008, p. 216). Consequently, the improved relationship, as confirmed by the ICTY’s 
Chief Prosecutor, was the main reason to resume the frozen negotiations over Serbia’s SAA 
(Freyberg-Inan, Spoerri, 2008, p. 366). In 2008, the governing coalition delivered results 
almost immediately by arresting two long-time fugitives: Zupljanin in June, and Karadzic in 
July 2008. The last two suspects, Mladic and Hadzic, were captured in May and June 2011 
(Obradovic-Wochnik, Wochnik, 2012, p. 1176) 
Furthermore, applying conditions and the subsequent denial or delay of the benefits for 
compliance might also have slowed down the adoption of reforms to support the country’s 
liberal democratic development. These conditions have also served to isolate Serbia’s pro-
reform forces from those international actors willing to actively support the consolidation of 
democracy, and their associated support (Freyberg-Inan, Spoerri, 2008, p. 366). Not only has 
discussion about the ICTY hampered policy reforms on the domestic level but pro-reform 
forces’ agendas have suffered because they have committed to external demands for 
cooperation which have been perceived as excessive or threatening by many among the Serbs 
(Freyberg-Inan, Spoerri, 2008, p. 367). Overall, it becomes clear that the demand to fully 
cooperate with the Tribunal is a key factor in the dynamics “linking conditionality, punitive 
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international isolation, and difficulties in Serbia’s liberal democratic trajectory” (Freyberg-
Inan, Spoerri, 2008, p. 366).  
The EC Progress Reports  
As with Bosnia, Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY has been traced in the EC Progress 
Reports. The issue has been a central determinant for the country’s progress in the accession 
process. Throughout the reports from the start in 2005 until 2011 it has been stressed that 
cooperation is “an integral part of the EU’s political conditionality” (EC, Serbia, 2005, p. 22) 
“including all possible efforts to arrest and transfer indictees” (EC, Serbia, 2008, p. 5) and 
that “full cooperation with the ICTY remains an essential condition of the EU” (EC, Serbia, 
2011, p. 33).  
As mentioned above, Serbia’s accession process has been marked with both negative and 
positive developments. On the negative side, in 2005, for example, the Commission reported 
that cooperation “is still sometimes obstructed by those in the administration and the army in 
possession of documents but unwilling to cooperate with the ICTY” and the country “has not 
yet fully aligned itself with the EU common position on freezing the assets of ICTY 
fugitives” (EC, Serbia, 2005, p. 23). In 2006 the Report directly stated that Serbia “did not 
meet its commitments on cooperation” with the ICTY leading to the Commission calling off 
the negotiations (EC, Serbia, 2006, p. 5). Furthermore, it added that “no progress was made 
on any of the six remaining fugitives, all of whom have connections in Serbia” (EC, Serbia, 
2006, p. 15) and that “there is no guarantee that any high-profile war crimes trials could be 
conducted in a fair and transparent manner” (EC, Serbia, 2006, p. 16). In 2007, four indictees 
remained at large but this still led the Commission to declare that “Serbia has not yet achieved 
full cooperation” (EC, Serbia, 2007, p. 17). In 2009 among the negative comments in the 
Report were the two remaining fugitives Mladic and Hadzic (EC, Serbia, 2009, p. 19), and the 
Tribunal Chief Prosecutor’s concern of “negative statements made by senior government 
officials about the Tribunal’s judicial decisions” (EC, Serbia, 2009, p. 20). Nevertheless, 
especially since the capture of the last war criminals in the following years, cooperation has 
been increasing. 
Among the positive developments in the relationship between Serbia and the ICTY have been 
the 2006 waivers for witnesses and access to documentation and archives called “good work” 
by the Commission (EC, Serbia, 2006, p. 15) which continued in 2007 with the handover of 
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documents by the reinstated National Council for Cooperation with the ICTY (EC, Serbia, 
2007, p. 16). The arrest of Karadzic in 2008 invoked commentaries for “significant progress 
on improving cooperation” with the Tribunal (EC, Serbia, 2008, p. 21) and in 2009 this 
cooperation “further improved” (EC, Serbia, 2009, p. 19). In 2010 the Report was extremely 
positive, citing the ICTY Chief Prosecutor whose report claimed that “no requests remain 
outstanding” regarding witnesses, documents and archives (EC, Serbia, 2010, p. 18). The EC 
Report from the same year concluded that overall “Serbia’s international obligations are 
broadly complied with” (EC, Serbia, 2010, p. 21). In 2011, cooperation was deemed as 
“greatly improved” and reaching a “fully satisfactory level” (EC, Serbia, 2011, p. 33), and in 
the 2012 report it “continued to be fully satisfactory” (EC, Serbia, 2012, p. 18).  
Conclusion 
 
The analysis above suggests that, in the case of Serbia, ethno-politics and the legacy of civil 
war have had different effects on the EU accession process. While nationalistic sentiments 
have at times obstructed political consensus on EU integration, this has not been a game-
changer for an upgrade in Serbia’s membership status. What is more, in terms of political 
representation, ethnic parties’ participation has been, in fact, encouraged. However, the issue 
of cooperation with the ICTY has played a crucial and much more pronounced role in the 
accession process, directly affecting the negotiations and the membership status. Most 
recently, this issue has become less of a determining factor but that is exclusively owing to 
the current fully satisfactory compliance by Serbia.  
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Croatia 
This chapter will analyze the case of Croatia and the extent to which the country’s domestic 
costs for rule compliance are affected by ethnicity and the legacies of civil war. Croatia is 
furthest on the road to EU membership – it is currently and acceding country and will become 
a full EU member state on 1 July 2013. This analysis will trace the accession process and will 
illustrate how Croatia’s relationship with the ICTY, and its nationalist tendencies have 
substantially delayed it. The first section will give a brief overview of the political 
developments in Croatia throughout the 1990s and during the post-Tudjman era, and the 
democratization process. The second section will look at ethnicity and nationalism on the 
domestic level as factors determining the degree of membership in the EU by analyzing the 
EC progress reports between 2005 and 2012. The third section will analyze the relationship 
between Croatia and the ICTY by investigating the EC Progress Reports from the same 
period, and will evaluate whether this direct civil war legacy affected the delay in Croatia’s 
accession to the EU.  
Croatia’s road to Europe  
In the wars in Yugoslavia Croatia emerged as the clear victor due to its defeat of Serb forces 
and its success in establishing an independent state (Peskin, 2005, p. 215). In June 1991 
Croatia declared independence which ignited the war with Serbia over the Serb population in 
Eastern Croatia. The war continued until 1995 when two successful military operations 
(named Flash and Storm) by Croatia’s army regained the lost territories and “paved the way 
for the country’s emergence as a regional power” (Peskin, 2005, p. 216). For President Franjo 
Tudjman and his nationalist supporters the independence war – known as the Homeland War 
– became the centerpiece of the nation-building project. It was also the main source of 
legitimacy for the ruling party.  
Tudjman led the country until December 1999 (Peskin, 2005, p. 218). The subsequent defeat 
of his nationalist party – the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) – in elections in early 2000 
transformed politics in Croatia and changed the dynamics of the state’s foreign affairs. The 
six-party coalition that formed, led by Ivica Racan and his Social Democratic party (SDP), 
embarked on a road to repair the war-torn economy of the country and re-orient towards the 
West (Peskin, 2005, p. 219). After a period of isolation in the 1990s, the new discourse 
focused on the perception that isolation was neither viable nor desirable in the long run, and 
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that to survive as a state, Croatia should turn towards Europe. The conviction was that if it 
remained outside, there were risks of economic and political regression, leading to permanent 
insecurity and fear of defenselessness (Jovic, 2006, p. 93). During the post-Tudjman era the 
Croatian government also wanted to distance itself from the designated group “Western 
Balkans” because of the problematic associations that stemmed from that, and wanted to 
demonstrate its ability to be European (Massari, 2010, p. 265). Finally, membership in the EU 
began to be seen as the ultimate recognition of the Country as a “normal European state”. 
Membership was also seen as a “second recognition”, the first being the official independence 
in 1992, while the second would be a confirmation for Croatia’s democratic credentials 
(Jovic, 2006, p. 87).  
The democratic development of Croatia has also been measured in Freedom House’s Nations 
in Transit Report. In the 2012 Report Croatia’s overall score is 3.61 and it is classified as 
semi-consolidated democracy (Freedom House, 2012). In the report specific attention has 
been given to a number of issues. Firstly, the EU’s positive decision on Croatia’s membership 
has been classified as a clear progress indicator. However, the report notes that progress 
towards the EU is still to be internalized by society and institutions on the local level, citing 
public opinion polls revealing that Croatians are not well informed about their country’s EU 
negotiation process, or about what that means in terms of rights and democratic standards. 
Another issue noted by the report is government cooperation regarding war crimes committed 
in the 1990s which the report deems insufficient, citing a law which does not recognize war 
crimes investigations targeting Croatia but executed by Serbia. (Freedom House, 2012, p. 
164). While anti-corruption efforts have been stepped up and the score under this section is 
higher than during the previous year, the overall score has only slightly improved over the last 
few years. Generally, however, Croatia is moving in the right direction towards accession.  
In its 2012 Annual Report on Croatia, Amnesty International’s main emphasis is the slow 
progress in regards to prosecution of war crimes committed during the war between 1991 and 
1995, with many crimes remaining unaddressed. While certain efforts by the President and 
the authorities were noted as attempting to address the wartime past, little action actually took 
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place on the part of the government, while important political figures contested the judgments 
of international courts
13
. 
This overview suggests that while Croatia is much further than Serbia and Bosnia i 
Herzegovina in its EU accession process, similar issues stand out as obstacles to a smooth 
democratic transition towards EU membership. The next section will turn towards the 
presence of ethnopolitics and nationalistic tendencies, and the implications these have had for 
Croatia’s membership in the Union in terms of increased or diminished costs for rule 
compliance. 
Ethnopolitics in Croatia – enter nationalism  
When it comes to Croatia, the situation is similar to that of Serbia. In the 1990s, the country 
had the characteristics of a “nationalizing state”, with its perception of the state as an ethno-
cultural community of and for Croats, as well as demographic, linguistic, cultural, political 
and economic domination promoted and protected by the state (Koska, 2012, p. 402). The 
Homeland War was, in the words of Tudjman, the culmination of the country’s “thousand 
year-old dream” and Croatian nationalists developed an ability to exploit the symbols of the 
war as political tools (Peskin, Boduszynski, 2003, p. 1123).  
In that sense the classical ethnopolitics frame, as observed, for example, in Bosnia i 
Herzegovina, has played a more limited role in comparison to nationalism which has been 
markedly present in Croatia. The following section will investigate to what extent 
nationalistic politics have dominated and continue to be present in the Croatian political 
scene. 
The Political Landscape 
The Croatian state was created under conditions of aggression and war, and this produced 
very strong defensive nationalism and national identification (Sekulic, 2004, p. 473). For 
nationalists in Croatia, the country led an independence war resulting in both a victory but 
also victimization of Croats for suffering under the Serbs (Peskin, 2005, 216). Croatia in the 
1990s has often been described as an “authoritarian populist regime”, “democratic 
despotism”, and “its party system as unipolar” (Jou, 2010, p. 100). As a result, ethno-religious 
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divides were a major cleavage, unlike economic issues which did not constitute a significant 
divide (Jou, 2010, p. 100).  
However, by the end of the 1990s, the policies of the Tudjman government had failed (Koska, 
2012, p. 403). In 2000, the victory of a center-left coalition government in the Parliamentary 
elections brought Croatia onto a new road in its democratic consolidation. As a result, the 
nationalistic rhetoric was replaced by EU integration, which constituted the new national 
priority (Koska, 2012, p. 397-8). In the following years Croatia developed a “moderate 
pluralist and not very polarized party system, which is the basis for democratic consolidation” 
(Zakosek, 2008, p. 600). In terms of its international obligations, as compared to Serbia, 
Croatia turned out to be more cooperative and responsive. While this has often been criticized 
by nationalists, it has ultimately proven more beneficial for the national interests and for 
democracy (Zakosek, 2008, p. 604).  
Nevertheless, more often than not, the legacies of the war have been presenting Croatia with a 
dilemma between fully committing to protect minority rights and human rights, and persistent 
nationalist sentiments, and this largely defines its relationship with the European Union 
within the accession process (Roter, Bojinovic, 2005, p. 451-2). The next section will analyze 
the relationship between Croatia and the EU through the lens of the country’s internal 
political environment. 
Croatia and Brussels  
When it comes to Croatia’s EU integration, the process can be divided in two distinct periods 
– the period of the 1990s under Franjo Tudjman, and the period from 2000, with the change in 
government, to the current moment.  
Tudjman’s regime after the Dayton peace agreement became hostile to the idea of Europe and 
to the EU, and turned suspicious towards supra-national organizations. In addition, as a 
winner of the wars, Tudjman appeared confident enough to reject the demands of the EU 
defined in the Regional Approach policy from 1997. He was critical towards Europe for not 
helping his country during the wars and for not completely supporting the independence. As a 
result, Croatia changed its constitution and added an article which prohibited membership in 
any organization which could possibly result in a renewal of Yugoslavia (Jovic, 2006, p. 85-
86). The EU’s response was freezing the relationship with Croatia, thus contributing to 
42 
 
Croatia’s unofficial international isolation towards the end of the decade. With the death of 
Tudjman and the ideological and political shift regarding the idea of Europe, Croatia really 
only began its EU journey in 2000 (Jovic, 2006, p. 86).  
According to Jovic (2006), the prospect of EU membership changed Croatian politics in three 
aspects. It defeated isolationist nationalism, it brought about consensus on EU integration on 
the domestic level, which successfully bridged the gap between the different segments of the 
population, and resulted in a foreign policy orientation much more open to regional 
cooperation (Jovic, 2006, p. 86). Furthermore, compliance with EU conditions related to 
Croatia’s identity as a Western and democratic state, while it was continuously emphasized 
that non-compliance would result in “staying at the Balkan level of closed-minded 
nationalism and pursuit of archaic interpretations of sovereignty and state interest” (Zambelli, 
2010, 1673).  
The landmark elections in 2000 brought to the fore a pronounced EU-integration policy and, 
with some delay, other parties also adopted such a pro-EU orientation (Zambelli, 2008, p. 
174). The new discourse could be characterized as pro-European, the country was not hostile 
to Southeast Europe anymore and it publicly supported the EU membership of all countries in 
the region (Jovic, 2006, p. 94). Croatia applied for membership in the EU in February 2003 
(Fink-Hafner, 2008, p. 172). Shortly after, during the same year, new elections brought back 
Tudjman’s party, the HDZ. Its leader and new prime minister Ivo Sanader was, however, far 
from the party’s ideology from the previous years and quickly confirmed his commitment to 
EU membership, deeming it a priority objective. He also committed to full cooperation with 
the ICTY (Jovic, 2006, p. 98).  
Nowadays, Croatia’s political elites are seeking to project the new image of the state as 
having little to do with the nationalistic discourse characterizing the 1990s (Koska, 2012, p. 
407). Strict conditionality, mainly related to cooperation with The Hague Tribunal, and the 
resulting internal political environment as a response, however, have resulted in unstable 
support for EU membership. In September 2004 results from a public opinion poll claimed 
that only 49% of Croats supported membership, while 41% were against it (Roter, Bojinovic, 
2005, p. 451).  
On June 1 2004 Croatia was designated a status of a candidate country. After accession 
negotiations lasting from 2005, on December 9, 2011, EU leaders and Croatia signed the 
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accession treaty. A referendum in Croatia on January 22 2012 resulted in 66% of voters 
giving their “yes” to joining the EU. Once ratified by all EU member states, the treaty will 
grant full membership to Croatia, making it its 28
th
 member state on 1 July 2013
14
. 
The next section will go more in depth regarding the EC’s Progress Reports on Croatia and 
will analyze to what extent ethno- and nationalistic politics have been stumbling blocks in 
Serbia’s accession process.  
The EC Progress Reports 2005-2012 
It should be noted from the outset that for the time period in question (2005-2012) Croatia had 
already largely put behind its nationalistic discourse, which had defined its political 
environment in the 1990s, as described above. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that almost no 
evidence can be found in the EC Reports about ethnopolitics and nationalism defining the 
internal political environment. As noted above, Croatia’s internal EU-consensus and general 
direction towards EU integration largely subdued the nationalist rhetoric. However, a related 
issue, which has been a stumbling block for Croatia’s EU aspirations all throughout the 
covered period, is the issue of ethnic bias towards national minorities. 
While the 2004 EC Opinion on Croatia’s EU membership application confirmed that there 
were “no major problems over assuring the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights”, 
the rights of minorities, in particular the Serb minority, needed to be addressed (EC, Croatia, 
2005, p. 10). According to the 2005 Progress Report, national minorities, Serbs and Roma, 
continued to be perceived and presented as separate entities as well as far from being an 
integral part of Croat society (EC, Croatia, 2005, p. 21). The main issues with the Serb 
minority have been deemed a direct legacy of the war in 1991-1995 and have to do largely 
with the return of refugees and restitutions of their property (EC, Croatia, 2005, p. 22).  
The EC has also stressed on the importance of investigating incidents motivated by ethnic 
bias. It noted that prosecutions are rare and that not much has been achieved in implementing 
the Constitutional Law on National Minorities (CLNM) – the landmark document guiding 
Croat policy towards its minorities (EC, Croatia, 2005, p. 22). The latter’s implementation 
improved in 2006, including “adequate minority representation” in regional assemblies and 
eight minority Members of Parliament (EC, Croatia, 2006, p. 11). General perception of 
                                                             
14
 A timeline of Croatia’s accession process can be found here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/croatia/index_en.htm  
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national minorities did not change in 2006 and again included negative stereotyping. In the 
same year, “the number of apparently ethnically motivated attacks against the Serb minority” 
remained unchanged as compared to the previous year, including also lack of “clear 
statements condemning ethnically motivated incidents when they occur” (EC, Croatia, 2006, 
p. 12). The situation remained similar in 2007 as well (EC, Croatia, 2007, p. 13).  
In 2008, the Report called for a “long-term strategy to implement the CLNM minority 
employment provisions”. In that year, for the first time “an ethnic Serb has been appointed to 
one of the Deputy Prime Minister posts” and the number of reports on ethnically motivated 
assaults decreased (EC, Croatia, 2008, p. 13). In 2009 the implementation of the 
Constitutional Law on minorities was deemed “a key Accession Partnership priority” (EC, 
Croatia, 2009, p. 14). While some positive developments have, indeed, taken place regarding 
the position of the Serb minority, over the following years the reports have persistently 
claimed that discrimination continues (EC, Croatia, 2009, p. 15; 2010, p. 14; 2011, p. 12). In 
2011 a long-term strategy on minority employment for 2011-2014 was finally put in place and 
adopted the same year and the “number of reported racist or xenophobic incidents has been 
fairly limited, in particular compared to previous years” with generally adequate response 
from politicians and law enforcement (EC, Croatia, 2011, p. 12). In the 2012 Communication 
on the Main Findings of the Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Croatia’s preparedness to 
join the EU (2012), progress has been noted, although “the level of employment of minorities 
in the state administration and judiciary remains below the requirement set by the act” (p. 4).  
However, none of the issues described above has constituted a direct obstacle to EU 
membership. Rather, along with other requirements in the accession process, it has been part 
of the overall EU conditionality.  
The ICTY and EU membership 
This section will investigate Croatia’s record in dealing with legacies of civil war, in 
particular its relations with the ICTY in the context of EU accession conditionality. The first 
section will trace the cooperation with the Tribunal under the different governments over the 
past two decades in order to better analyze in the second section how EU conditionality for 
cooperation translated in the domestic political environment. The third section will analyze 
the EC Progress Reports and how the Croatia-ICTY cooperation, or lack thereof, has 
resonated in the Commission’s overall judgment of progress in the country. 
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Croatia and the ICTY 
Croatia’s relationship with the ICTY can be divided into specific periods. The first period 
would be Tudjman’s regime, followed by Ivica Racan’s government between 2000 and 2003, 
and Ivo Sanader’s policy in the following parliamentary mandate.  
Franjo Tudjman’s policy was continuous non-cooperation and criticism towards the Tribunal 
as an anti-Croat establishment. Furthermore, Tudjman steadily refused to recognize the 
ICTY’s right to investigate the war crimes committed by Croats during the two successful 
operations Storm and Flash. Non-cooperation included obstruction of efforts by the 
investigators to find important evidence, and slow issuing of indictments for Croatian 
generals. This resulted in an official report to the UN Security Council by ICTY President 
Antonio Cassese on Croatia’s non-compliance in 1996. In 1999 another report regarding non-
compliance was submitted protesting against obstruction of investigations on war crimes 
committed by Croats (Peskin, Boduszynski, 2003, p. 1124).  
The entry of the new government in 2000 and its quick moves towards cooperating with the 
Tribunal led many to believe that the country’s anti-ICTY policy died with the Tudjman 
regime. This was also prompted by concrete actions from the new government including the 
creation of an ICTY liaison office in Zagreb, and a transfer of one Bosnian Croat suspect of 
war crimes to The Hague (Peskin, Boduszynski, 2003, p. 1125). However, the biggest test for 
the new government was the Tribunal’s indictments of two Croatian generals in 2001 – 
General Rahim Ademi and General Ante Gotovina (Peskin, Boduszynski, 2003, p. 1128). 
Initially Racan’s government reacted with proclaiming it will immediately hand over the 
indictees. However, Racan failed to move quickly and arrest the generals, allowing for them 
to escape the authorities (Peskin, Boduszynski, 2003, p. 1130). This has largely been due to 
the Prime Minister’s attempt at balancing cooperation with the ICTY, and thus good relations 
with the international community, while at the same time keeping his government together 
and avoiding to completely alienate the various nationalist groups. The latter had been piling 
rhetorical attacks which portrayed the indictments as “an attempt to criminalize the Homeland 
War and cast blame on all Croatians” (Peskin, Boduszynski, 2003, p. 1129). Gotovina’s 
escape encouraged the nationalist forces and undermined the government, thus showing that 
nationalists were capable of defying the government policy of arresting ICTY suspects 
(Peskin, Boduszynski, 2003, p. 1131). 
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With the return of the HDZ in power in 2003, Ivo Sanader pursued a policy of engagement 
with The Hague which led to Zagreb fulfilling its obligations to transfer indictees to ICTY 
custody (Lamont, 2010, p. 1683-4). The crucial change was that instead of forestalling the 
transfer of individuals itself, the Sanader government complied with arrests and transfers but 
refocused on contesting the trials within the Tribunal chambers (Lamont, 2010, p. 1685). 
Essentially, these defiance strategies enabled the government to reframe rule conformity in a 
way which was consistent with the party’s defence of the Homeland War, and this resulted in 
compliance with international and domestic incentives, namely the connection between EU 
accession and ICTY cooperation (Lamont, 2010, p. 1685). The next section will analyze this 
connection in more detail. 
The ICTY and Brussels  
Compliance with ICTY requirements as part of EU conditionality for membership has 
constituted a problem for Croatia all along but this has been a question of more than just 
policy adjustment and introducing new laws – it needed to address some of the fundamental 
features defining the Croatian state (Zambelli, 2010, p. 1665-6).  
The change of government in 2000 was warmly welcomed by the European Union and was 
seen as a success in the EU’s policy in the Western Balkans. Croatia hosted the Zagreb 
Summit and signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in 
October 2001 (Jovic, 2006, p. 95-6). The new government reasserted its position that EU 
membership was the main goal behind the country’s cooperation with the ICTY and defined 
this cooperation as a national interest (Zambelli, 2010, p. 1668). This development was highly 
contested by nationalists, which substantially slowed down the implementation of the 
Agreement, specifically regarding cooperation with the Tribunal. The indictments of 
Gotovina in 2001 and Janko Bobetko in 2002 became serious challenges for the divided 
internal political environment (Jovic, p. 95-6). While Bobetko died before being transferred to 
the Tribunal, the case of Gotovina’s extradition remained one of the major obstacles to the 
accession of Croatia to the EU and NATO, as well as the cause for a substantial delay in the 
ratification of the SAA (Jovic, p. 97).  
While under Sanader a lot of positive developments for Croatia’s accession took place, 
cooperation with the ICTY regarding General Gotovina remained the most difficult 
requirement to fulfill. Due to lack of results on this issue, in 2005 the European Council 
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postponed the date to start the accession talks with Croatia until that requirement is met. 
However, a report by ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte a few weeks later confirmed 
Croatia’s full cooperation with the court which resulted in the immediate Council decision to 
begin the accession talks (Jovic, 2006, p. 100-1). In the immediate aftermath of these events 
in October 2005, opinion polls showed public support for Croatia’s membership in the Union 
– from 33% it rose to 49.6%, as the EU was not seen anymore as unfair to Croatia and no 
major anti-European political party existed anymore (Jovic, 2006, p. 102).  
The next section will examine the EC Progress Reports from 2005 to 2012 and will evaluate 
what role cooperation with the ICTY played for the degree of EU membership of Croatia.  
The EC Progress Reports 2005-2012 
Cooperation with The Hague Tribunal has been a major part of the EU’s accession 
conditionality for Croatia. Along with cooperation with the ICTY itself, the EU also closely 
monitored domestic war crimes trials in Croatia, as well as regional cooperation among the 
former Yugoslavian countries in transfer and prosecution of war crimes indictees.  
The 2005 Report, citing the EC Opinion of 2004, claimed that cooperation has significantly 
improved and Croatia was deemed fully cooperating with the ICTY. But also that it is crucial 
for the country to “take all necessary steps to ensure that the remaining indictee is located and 
transferred to the ICTY” (EC, Croatia, 2005, p. 10). Further in the report of the same year, 
cooperation on locating, arresting and transferring Gotovina was deemed “not sufficiently 
robust to yield significant results” which led to the postponement of the launch of accession 
negotiations in March 2005 (EC, Croatia, 2005, p. 23-24). Later in the same year, with the 
stated re-establishment of full cooperation in October, negotiations could begin (EC, Croatia, 
2005, p. 24). Domestic war crimes trials have also been monitored. They have been mostly 
against Serbs, “with little appetite to try Croats” (EC, Croatia, 2005, p. 25) and “Serbs 
pursued in large numbers for less serious offences while Croats are pursued almost 
exclusively for killings” (EC, Croatia, 2005, p. 25). Interstate cooperation regarding war 
crimes with bilateral agreements between state prosecutors from Serbia, Montenegro and 
Bosnia were marked as positively progressing (EC, Croatia, 2005, p. 25). 
Following the arrest of Ante Gotovina in December 2005, the last indictee was transferred 
from Croatia to The Hague (EC, Croatia, 2006, p. 13). On this subject, the Report noted the 
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Croatian government’s “willingness to support his defence” and local authorities’ financial 
contributions, pointing to the fact that this is “indicative of the general mood that little is said 
in public discourse about the need to establish the truth about who is responsible for the 
crimes for which Ante Gotovina and the other Croatian generals are indicted” (EC, Croatia, 
2006, p. 14). Nevertheless, regarding domestic war crimes trials “willingness to prosecute 
Croats for war crimes is slowly increasing” (EC, Croatia, 2006, p. 14). Still, no mechanism 
existed to end ethnic bias and ensure the application of “a uniform standard of criminal 
responsibility” (EC, Croatia, 2006, p. 15).  
In 2007 Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY was on the positive side (EC, Croatia, 2007, p. 
15), while in 2008 issues with access by the Tribunal to documentation in Croatia triggered an 
urge by the EC for Croatia’s full commitment to tackling this issue. Regarding regional 
cooperation, in May 2008 there was a conference on prosecution of war crimes with the chief 
prosecutors of Croatia, Bosnia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Serbia, but the persistent problems regarding the transfer of cases and extraditing suspects in 
war crimes cases remained a concern (EC, Croatia, 2008, p. 15). The 2009 Report also 
stressed the importance of cooperation with the Tribunal on access to important documents 
(EC, Croatia, 2009, p. 16). The obstacles regarding extradition of suspects in war crimes cases 
between countries in the region persisted, according to the report, and this “exacerbates the 
problem of impunity”. Regarding domestic war crimes trials, “a more balanced approach is 
slowly becoming evident with a greater willingness to prosecute perpetrators irrespective of 
ethnicity” (EC, Croatia, 2009, p. 9). However, among major obstacles was that in those trials, 
quite often the “convicted person’s role in the defence of the homeland as a mitigating factor” 
has been creating “a clear ethnic bias in sentencing for comparable crimes” (EC, Croatia, 
2009, p. 9-10). In 2010 access to documentation by the ICTY remained a problem (EC, 
Croatia, 2010, p. 15). Ethnic bias in domestic war crimes trials continued (EC, Croatia, 2010, 
p. 8). A positive development was an amended agreement with Bosnia i Herzegovina on 
mutual enforcement regarding court decision aimed at closing the impunity gap (EC, Croatia, 
2010, p. 16). 
In 2011, the verdicts at the ICTY against the Generals Gotovina and Markac resulted in 
protests in various cities across the country and public declarations, including on politically 
high levels, which, according to the EC “have not been conducive to the efforts to create a 
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climate in Croatia more fertile for reconciliation and dealing with the legacy of the 1990s” 
(EC, Croatia, 2011, p. 13).  
In the Communication on Croatia’s preparedness for EU membership from 2012 the EC has 
confirmed Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY and encouraged the country to intensify its 
efforts to fight impunity and to facilitate the protection of witnesses. An important note is 
“Croatia’s firm commitment to supporting the other countries in the region on their path to the 
EU” combined with the continued engagement in “cooperation on war crimes at the bilateral 
and regional level and good cooperation between judicial authorities, in particular 
prosecutors” (EC, Croatia, 2012, p. 4).  
Conclusion 
 
The analysis above points to a number of conclusions. Firstly, ethnopolitics and nationalistic 
politics have remained a thing of the past and have not affected the EU accession process 
directly. However, ethnic bias towards the Serb minority has been quite persistent, including 
ethnically motivated incidents, lack of employment opportunities, issues with refugee return 
and housing, and domestic war crimes trials. Nevertheless, these have not constituted a direct 
threat to Croatia’s EU bid. Secondly, and very much related to the persistent ethnic bias and 
nationalism, regarding the ICTY, non-cooperation has resulted in delays in the accession 
process, in particular the delay in launching the accession negotiations in 2005 due to 
Croatia’s lack of cooperation.  
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Conclusion 
 
The goal of this thesis was to test two factors – ethnicity and civil war legacies – and their 
effect on degrees of membership in the EU for three FY countries. A detailed case study 
analysis in the framework of Rational Choice Institutionalism was carried out and it resulted 
in a number of conclusions. It has provided evidence both supporting and opposing the three 
hypotheses for each country.  
It can be concluded that democratic consolidation has been an important stepping stone for all 
three aspiring countries analyzed here. The EU’s requirement for complying with the 
Copenhagen criteria as a fundamental condition for membership has to a large extent induced 
the development of the democratic credentials of the examined cases.  
The second hypothesis tested the extent to which the presence of ethnopolitics hampers an 
upgrade in membership status. Evidence for Bosnia has supported this hypothesis as the lack 
of consensus among the ethnic political parties on the domestic level has directly resulted in 
the delay to offer the country a candidate status. As for Serbia, while political representation 
of ethnic minorities has been encouraged, some impediments for cooperation with the EU 
have largely been the result of nationalistic tendencies persisting after the ousting of 
Milosevic. These tendencies, however, have not constituted a direct obstacle to the country’s 
degree of EU membership. Croatia’s EU bid has also been affected by ethnopolitics in a 
limited manner. As in Serbia, Croatia’s internal political environment has been characterized 
by nationalistic tendencies which have, however, been largely subdued throughout the first 
decade of the 21
st
 century. Nevertheless, Croatia’s relationship with the Serb minority on its 
territory has been closely monitored by Brussels. However, developments in this area did not 
constitute a direct condition for upgrading Croatia’s membership status.  
As for the third hypothesis relating to overcoming the legacies of civil war translated into 
cooperation with the ICTY, results also differ per case study. While for all three countries 
cooperation with the Tribunal has been set as an explicit condition for membership, this has 
affected the case countries differently. In Bosnia, cooperation has been present and has been 
carried out quite smoothly, with no major obstacles affecting EU membership. In Serbia, by 
contrast, non-cooperation with the ICTY directly resulted in stopping the accession 
negotiations, thus becoming a real impediment in Serbia’s accession process. The cooperation 
in arresting and transferring all Serbs indicted for war crimes during the Yugoslav wars have 
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also played a decisive role in Serbia’s case. In Croatia, similar to Serbia, non-cooperation has 
had a direct bearing on the delay in the accession negotiations. Furthermore, other issues 
including reactions on the domestic level to ICTY indictments and verdicts towards Croatians 
have negatively affected accession. Nevertheless, unlike cooperation itself, these other issues 
have not constituted a direct impediment to an upgrade in the membership status. 
To conclude, this thesis has established that the two central variables – ethnicity and civil war 
legacies – play differentiated roles in the case countries’ compliance with EU conditionality. 
It has also been shown that this is the case because of conditions on the domestic level 
requiring a cost-benefit analysis by the aspiring states which either prevents or empowers 
political actors to comply. Thus, political actors’ rationalist calculations regarding 
ethnopolitics and civil war legacies fit well to explain their compliance (or lack thereof) with 
EU rules. Consequently, it can be concluded that the rational choice institutionalist framework 
has served a good purpose in explaining the role of ethnicity and civil war legacies in FY 
countries’ EU accession processes. 
It is important to point out that other politically significant indicators have also affected the 
case countries’ degrees of membership. For example, in Bosnia, the federal division of the 
two entities has directly contradicted the EU’s aspirations for centralized government and this 
has resulted in limited progress. In Serbia, dealing with minorities in its provinces, as well as 
with the Roma population has constantly been an important area for improving government 
performance. In Croatia, an issue which has persistently played a crucial role in the country’s 
accession process has been the border disputes with its neighbours. However, these issues are 
beyond the scope of this thesis and, therefore, generalizations relating to them cannot be 
made. 
Furthermore, even though the hypotheses were supported to different degrees, they only 
form part of the overall picture of EU conditionality for countries of the Former 
Yugoslavia. While this thesis has contributed to a gap in research regarding specific factors 
affecting West Balkan countries’ degrees of EU membership, further research in this field 
is needed to determine, first, if the tested factors also affect the rest of the FY countries’ 
accession processes in the same way, and second, within these processes, what other 
factors have been crucial in provoking or preventing an upgrade in status.  
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